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INTRODUCTION
Information infrastructures across many public and private domains share several common attributes 
regarding information technology (IT) deployments and data communications. This is particularly true 
in the control systems domain. A majority of the systems use robust architectures to enhance business 
and reduce costs by increasing the integration of external, business, and control system networks. 
However, multi-network integration strategies often lead to vulnerabilities that greatly reduce the 
security of an organization and can expose mission-critical control systems to cyber threats.  
This document provides guidance and direction for developing “defense-in-depth” strategies for 
organizations that use control system networks while maintaining a multi-tier information architecture 
that requires the following: 
? Maintenance of various field devices, telemetry collection, and/or industrial-level process systems 
? Access to facilities via remote data link or modem 
? Public-facing services for customer or corporate operations 
? A robust business environment that requires connections among the control system domain, the 
external Internet, and other peer organizations. 
BACKGROUND
The critical infrastructure systems that support major industries, such as manufacturing, transportation, 
and energy, are highly dependent on information systems for their command and control. While there 
is still a high dependence on legacy control systems, critical infrastructure/key resource (CI/KR) 
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systems are migrating to new communication technologies. As a result, the diverse and disparate 
proprietary mechanics of control systems are being replaced with common communications protocols 
and open architecture standards, which can have both positive and negative impacts.  
The new protocols and communication standards that are providing increased interoperability and 
control in the control system community are the same technologies that have been exploited and 
compromised in the Internet and networking domains. Figure 1 illustrates the traditional separation of 
corporate architectures and control domains. This architecture provided means for data sharing, data 
acquisition, peer-to-peer data exchange, and other business operations. However, the security of any 
given system was based on the fact that few, if any, understood the intricate architecture or the 
operational mechanics of the resources on the controls system local area network (LAN). This 
“security by obscurity” works well for environments that have no external communication connections 
and allows an organization to focus primarily on physical security.  
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Figure 1. Traditional isolation of corporate and control domains. 
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OVERVIEW OF CONTEMPORARY CONTROL SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURES 
In today’s competitive markets, isolated control system networks are being interconnected. In 
connecting these networks, and introducing IT components into the control system domain, security 
problems arise due to the following: 
? Increasing dependency on automation and control systems 
? Insecure connectivity to external networks 
? Usage of technologies with known vulnerabilities 
? Control system technologies have limited security 
? Control system communications protocols are absent of security functionality 
? Considerable amount of open source information is available regarding control system 
configuration and operations. 
Control system operational security has historically been defined by industry as the level of reliability 
of the system to operate. The total isolation from the external (and untrusted) network allowed the 
organization to reduce the level of communications security; threats to operations resided with physical 
access to a facility or plant floor. Thus, most data communications in the information infrastructure 
required limited authorization or security oversight.
Obviously, this arrangement is very different from effective network and IT cyber security systems. 
Figure 1 shows an integrated architecture, and it is clear that such architectures, if compromised, could 
provide an attacker with various avenues for accessing critical systems. The very nature of such 
architectures demands the exchange of data from disparate information sources, a factor that could 
clearly be taken advantage of by an attacker.1
SECURITY CHALLENGES IN CONTROL SYSTEMS 
Historically, security issues have been the responsibility of the corporate IT security organization, 
usually governed by security policies and operating plans that protect vital information assets. 
Contemporary network-based communications have security issues that must be addressed in the 
control system domain, because unique vendor-specific protocols and assumed legacy system security 
are not adequate to protect mission-critical systems.  
Examples of threats in open systems architectures that can (and most likely will) migrate to control 
system domains include hostile mobile code (if applicable to the system), escalations of privileges 
through code manipulation, network reconnaissance and data gathering, covert-traffic analysis, and 
unauthorized intrusions into networks, either through or around perimeter defenses. To fully translate 
1 This type of architecture, and the back-end control system, is vulnerable to both external attackers and internal attackers. Insider attacks 
have always been a major threat to IT systems, but architectures like the one shown in Figure 2 exacerbate the issue by providing access 
to a large, highly connected, and unprotected trusted information infrastructure. The insider has historically been a threat to control 
systems, but new connectivity creates opportunity for the external attacker as well.
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information security and information assurance into the control system realm, one must understand the 
key differences between traditional IT architectures and control systems technology.  
From a mitigation perspective, simply deploying IT security technologies into a control system may 
not be a viable solution. Although modern control systems use the same underlying protocols that are 
used in IT and business networks, the very nature of control system functionality may make even 
proven security technologies inappropriate. Much work has been done regarding some of the more 
common security elements an organization could leverage and how they are addressed in IT domains, 
as opposed to architectures that run control systems.2
SECURITY PROFILES AND ATTACK METHODOLOGIES 
Control networks have evolved from stand-alone islands to interconnected networks that co-exist with 
corporate IT environments, introducing security threats. For example, mobile code, in the form of 
viruses, worms, and parasitic code, can manifest itself in network-enabled control system 
environments just as easily as in non-control system domains. For devices with embedded firmware, 
such as controllers and relays, hostile mobile code cannot generally have an impact through network 
propagation. However, should the compiled code these devices download on a regular basis be 
corrupted with hostile malware, the effects could be very damaging.3
Critical cyber security issues that need to be addressed include those related to the following:
? Backdoors and holes in network perimeter 
? Vulnerabilities in common protocols  
? Attacks on field devices 
? Database attacks 
? Communications hijacking and “man-in-the-middle” attacks. 
Understanding attack vectors is essential to building effective security mitigation strategies, and 
effective security depends on how well the community of control system operators and vendors 
understand the ways that architectures can be compromised.4 For this document, a discussion of 
various attack vectors may provide some insight into how a defense-in-depth strategy can be effective. 
BACKDOOR ATTACKS VIA NETWORK PERIMETER5
2 NIST SP 800-82 has a concise section discussing these differences. 
3 Although the occurrence of this type of compromise is currently unlikely, such attack vectors should not be ignored when considering 
future attack scenarios. 
4 The technical mechanics of attacks are beyond the scope of this paper. 
5 http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/pdf/backdoors_holes0805.pdf 
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As is the case in common networking environments, control system domains are subject to myriad 
vulnerabilities and holes that can provide an attacker a “backdoor” to gain unauthorized access. 
Adversaries (threats) often do not require physical access to a domain to gain access to it and will use 
any and all discovered access functionality. Modern networks, especially those in the control-system 
arena, often have inherent capabilities that are deployed without sufficient security analysis and can 
provide access to attackers once they are discovered. These “backdoors” can be accidentally created in 
various places on the network, but it is the network perimeter that is of greatest concern. These 
technologies often include firewalls, public-facing services, and wireless access.  
ATTACKS USING COMMON PROTOCOLS (OPC/DCOM ATTACKS)6
The impact of modern operating systems on control systems has been significant. Over the last several 
years, more and more organizations have started to use underlying services in these environments, 
including the Object Link and Embedding (OLE) for Process Control (OPC). The convergence of 
traditionally isolated control networks with business environments, and the associated protocols, 
provides a new environment for attackers to exploit. What makes this very interesting, and also a 
concern, is that the traditional mitigation strategies for common networks are not always effective or 
practical in control systems architectures. In a simple example, SP2 for Microsoft XP, a platform 
commonly used in control systems, mitigates the security issues associated with some mobile code 
attacks by disabling DCOM (Distributed Common Object Model). If this patch is deployed in a 
production environment where OPC is used for interoperability, OPC over DCOM will not work. 
There have been several reports of this patch bringing production facilities to a complete stop or 
creating unexpected and irrational behavior in the control systems. 
With the convergence of control systems and modern networking technologies comes some inherited 
security vulnerabilities. Even though many of these vulnerabilities have solutions and available 
workarounds, the deployment of these mitigations in control systems architectures is not always 
feasible. 
ATTACKS INTO CONTROL SYSTEMS VIA FIELD DEVICES 
Control systems architectures usually have a capability for remote access to terminal end points and 
telemetry devices. In some cases, the field equipment itself has the capability to be accessed a number 
of ways, including by telephonic or dedicated means. To provide for the collection of operational and 
maintenance data, some modern equipment has embedded file servers and web servers to facilitate 
robust communications.  
However, as has been previously discussed, these devices are part of an internal and trusted domain, 
and, thus, access into these devices can provide an attacker with an unauthorized vector into the control 
system architecture. Recognizing that field devices, such as Remote Terminal Units (RTUs), are 
extensions of the control system domain, attackers can add these field devices to their list of viable 
6 See US-CERT “Security Implications of OPC, OLE, DCOM, and RPC in Control Systems.” 
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targets to be investigated during reconnaissance and scanning phases of the attack. If the attacker 
decides to scan back into the control network, which is probable considering the assumed trust between 
resources, it may be possible to do so by using the communications protocols for the entire control 
system domain. This is of particular advantage to the attacker, as it is likely that the connections are 
not monitored for malicious or suspect traffic.7
DATABASE AND SQL DATA INJECTION ATTACKS 8
Database applications have become core application components of control systems and their 
associated record keeping utilities. Traditional security models attempt to secure systems by isolating 
core control system components and concentrating security efforts against threats specific to those 
computers or software components. Database security within control systems follows these models by 
using generally independent systems that rely on one another for proper functionality. The high level 
of reliance between the two systems creates an expanded threat surface. The information contained in 
databases makes them high-value targets for any attacker, and the cascading effect of corrupted 
database content can impact data acquisition servers, historians, and even the operator HMI console. 
Moreover, compromise of key trusted assets, such as a database, creates additional resources the 
attacker can use for both reconnaissance and code execution. 
MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACKS9
Control system environments have traditionally been (or been intended to be) protected from non-
authorized persons by air gapping, and communications are trusted because the security is designed to 
prevent access to the control network. Three of the key security issues that arise from assumed trust are 
the ability of an attacker to (1) re-route data that is in transit on a network, (2) capture and analyze 
open critical traffic that is in plaintext format, and (3) reverse engineer any unique protocols to gain 
command over control communications. By combining all of these, an attacker can assume 
exceptionally high control over the data flowing in a network and, ultimately, direct both real and 
“spoofed” traffic to network resources in support of the desired outcome.  
Assuming an attacker has gained access onto the controls systems network, perhaps using any of the 
aforementioned attacks, he will use network reconnaissance to determine resources that are available 
on that network. Because the attack is on the control domain, this plaintext traffic can be harvested 
(sniffed) and taken offline for analysis and review. This allows the attacker to review and re-engineer 
packet and payload content, modify the instruction set to accommodate the goal of the attack, and re-
inject the new (and perhaps malicious) packet into the network.  
7 Some Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) can be updated with control systems signatures to help defend control domains. Usually, these 
systems are signature-based and will trigger upon recognition of malicious traffic. In lieu of a viable signature, IDS can be deployed to 
trigger upon recognition of non-specific traffic, or traffic that is not expected or unusual. See below for the discussion on IDS. 
8 See US-CERT “Attack Methodology Analysis: SQL Injection Attacks.” 
9 http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/pdf/csvul1105.pdf 
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ISOLATING AND PROTECTING ASSETS: DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH 
STRATEGIES
Modern IT architectures that involve both business and control network components share many 
common characteristics, regardless of how diversified their applications may be. In general, there are 
four main zones (see Figure 2) that provide the following: 
? External connectivity to the Internet, peer locations, and back-up facilities (Zone 1) 
? External connectivity for corporate communications (Zone 2) 
? Control systems communications from external services (Zone 3) 
? Control systems operations, be they process based or SCADA (Zone 4). 
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Figure 2. Common architecture zones. 
Each of these zones requires a unique security focus. A “peel-the-onion” analysis shows that an 
attacker trying to affect a critical-infrastructure system would most likely be after the core control 
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domain.10 In this paper, and in the suggested supporting documentation provided by DHS through US-
CERT, numerous categories of attacks and outcomes have been discussed. In each of the scenarios 
discussed in these documents, the intrusion begins at some point outside the control zone and the 
attacker pries deeper and deeper into the architecture. Thus, defensive strategies that secure each of the 
core zones can create a defensive strategy with depth, offering the administrators more opportunities 
for information and resources control and introducing cascading countermeasures that will not 
necessarily impede business functionality.
FIREWALLS
There are many types of firewalls, and some research is required to ascertain what type of firewall is 
right for a given control architecture. The concept of security zones provides some insight as to how an 
organization can determine what risk and consequence is associated with a particular zone. This 
analysis can be used to select the type of firewall and attributes that are best suited for protecting the 
assets. In general, there are four main types of firewalls: packet filter, circuit level gateways, proxy 
gateways, and stateful inspection. Considerable work has been done regarding analysis of firewalls for 
use in the industrial control domain.11
PACKET FILTER FIREWALLS 
Although usually flexible in assigning rules, the packet filter firewall is well suited for environments 
where quick connections are required and rules can be developed based on device addresses. It is 
effective for environments, such as control systems, that need security based on unique applications 
and protocols.?
PROXY GATEWAY FIREWALLS 
Proxy gateway firewalls are good for analyzing data inside the application (POST, GET, etc.) and 
collecting data about user activities (logon, administration, etc.). They are gateways that require users 
to direct their connection to the firewall. In control systems environments, this type of firewall is well 
suited to separating the business and control LANs and providing protection to a demilitarized zone 
(DMZ) and other assets that require application-specific defenses. 
STATEFUL INSPECTION FIREWALLS  
Stateful inspection firewalls include characteristics of all the other types of firewalls but tend to use 
algorithms to process data rather than run proxies. These firewalls execute a considerable amount of 
inspection of packets that are arriving on the interfaces, are capable of keeping track of valid sessions, 
and may make a good choice for protecting key assets in the control domain.  
10 This of course depends on the overall objective of the attacker. In general it is believed that complete control over core services and 
operational capability of the control system has high value. 
11 www.niscc.gov.uk/niscc/docs/re-20050223-00157.pdf 
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CREATING DEMILITARIZED ZONES
Network segmentation has traditionally been accomplished by using multiple routers. Firewalls should 
be used to create DMZs to protect the control system network. Figure 3 shows a robust architecture 
with multiple DMZ deployments to accommodate several types of services. 
.
Figure 3. Architecture with DMZ deployments. 
Multiple DMZs have proved to be very effective in protecting large architectures comprised of 
networks with different operational mandates. An example of this kind of  architecture is illustrated in 
Figure 3, which shows the conjoined networks for control systems and business. In this example, the 
secure flow of data into and out of the different environments is critical to operations. Having multiple 
DMZs protects the information resources from attacks using Virtual-LAN (VLAN) hopping and trust 
exploitation and is a very good way to enhance the security posture and add another layer to the 
defense-in-depth strategy. 
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INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS 
Most intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are signature based, and even though many contemporary IDS 
signatures files are very robust and can detect a wide range of attacks, the signatures required to 
monitor for malicious traffic in control networks are not adequate. When looking at the unique 
communications protocols used in control systems, such as Modbus or DNP3, specific payload and 
port numbers have traditionally not been a part of the signatures seen in contemporary IDSs. When 
deploying IDSs in a control system, the ability to add unique signatures must be used. It is also 
commonplace to remove some of the default signatures and response capability, as it may have no 
relevance to a control system network. However, analysis must be made to ensure that some of the 
inherent capability of the IDS is leveraged, with some of the capability refined and augmented. It is 
imperative, when deploying IDSs on control system networks, that rules sets and signatures unique to 
that domain be used. It has been shown that developing security signatures and rules in a cooperative 
relationship with the control system vendor is very advantageous.
THE SECURITY POLICY 
Effective security policies and procedures are the first step to a secure control systems network. Many 
of the same policies used for information technology (IT) security for corporate systems can be applied 
directly to control system networks. The SANS Institute provides free templates for many types of 
security policies and can be a valuable resource for control system network administrators in 
developing their own policies. Control system-specific requirements can then be added to it, such as 
the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) cyber security requirements for electric 
systems.12
To make the security policy effective, it must be practical and enforceable, and it must be possible to 
comply with the policy. The policy must not significantly impact productivity, be cost prohibitive, or 
lack support. This is best accomplished by including both management and system administrator 
personnel in policy development.  
SECURITY TRAINING 
Security training and robust security awareness programs that are specific to the controls systems 
domain are critical to the security of the control systems and the safety of those involved with any 
automated processes. Like the security awareness programs that are developed for the corporate 
domains, the programs that will support control-systems domains have key components that can help 
drive a continuous and measurable security posture. Within common security awareness programs, 
such as those listed in NIST SP800-50 “Building an Information Technology Security Awareness and 
Training Program”13, organizations can create applicable security awareness and training curricula. 
12 http://www.nerc.com/~filez/standards/Cyber_Sec_Renewal.html 
13 http://www.csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-50/NIST-SP800-50.pdf 
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INCIDENT RESPONSE 
To fully support a defense-in-depth strategy, a robust incident response capability is required. In the 
event that there is a security-related incident in the control system domain, activities to recognize, 
respond, mitigate, and resume need to be established. An incident response procedure will instruct 
employees on the steps to take if a computer on the network has been compromised. All employees 
should be trained on and have access to the procedure before an incident occurs. Examples of 
questions to be answered in the incident response procedure include the following: 
? What are the indications that an incident has occurred or is currently in progress? 
? What immediate actions should be taken (e.g., should the computer be unplugged from the 
network)? 
? Who should be notified and in what order? Should law enforcement be consulted? 
? How should forensic evidence be preserved (e.g., should the computer be left on to preserve the 
evidence in memory)?  
? How can the affected computers be restored? 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) developed a Computer Security Incident 
Handling Guide, SP 800-53, which provides guidance to security personnel in developing an incident 
response procedure. In addition, US-CERT has extensive information and reporting capabilities 
available for any control system security incident. This reporting can be done at http://www.us-
cert.gov/control_systems/. 
SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS AND COUNTERMEASURES
When protecting any information infrastructure, good security starts with a proactive security model. 
This iterative model is comprised of several key security strategies that are illustrated in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Proactive security model. 
Traditionally, development of a defense-in-depth strategy starts with mapping the control systems 
architecture. Having an accurate and well-documented architecture can enable an organization to be 
very security-conscious, deploy effective security countermeasures, and be equipped to understand 
security incidents more readily. Having an understanding of the architecture will allow the 
administrators to know what it is they want to protect.
A robust understanding of architecture also allows for effective risk assessments, as the development 
of the assessment parameters and processes can be easily aligned to the existing (and known) 
information assets in the control system environment. 
